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The Development and Failure
of the Nineteenth-Century
Evolutionary Theory of Ethics
DUANE McCAMPBELL
Harding University
The development, elaborat ion, and eventual failure of the nineteenth-century evolutionary theory of ethics constitutes one of the most interesting chapters in the history of ethics; at the same time , it demonstrates one of the major
weaknesses of the theory of evolution. Although the nineteenth century witnessed the eventual acceptance of the Darwinian explanation of evolution as a
process which proceeds through the nonethical process of natural selection, it
was only reluctantly that scientists of the Victorian era came to accept a theory
of evolution that promised no ethical guidance for humankind .
This study attempts to trace the development of evolutionary ethics from its
enthusiastic beginnings to its grudging failures, failures which were acknowledged by most evolutionists by the beginning of the twentieth century. It should
be added, however, that evolutionary ethics enjoyed a significant revival in the
~940s that continues to exert a strong influence in theological circles and to a
lesser degree in those of biology. In theology, Teilhard de Chard in developed a
religious interpretat ion of evolution, while in biology men of the stature of Julian Huxley and 8. F. Waddington added their prestige. Although this revival
has proved significant, this article will be limited to the original theory.
Nineteenth-Century
Alternatives to Darwinism

In order to account for the early enthusiasm about evolutionary ethics and its
eventual decline, it should be helpful to outline two nineteenth-century alternatives to the Darwinian theory, theories which made more room than current
evolutionary theory makes for ethical interpretations of nature.
The first of these, known as Lamarckian evolution, was popular until the
end of the century among evolutionists who were interested in ethics. Lamarck,
who preceded Darw in by a generation, had introduced the ideal of evolution earlier in the century, but his views had been rejected in his own lifetime in favor
of species immutability.
.
Along with the upsurge of interest in evolution following The Origin of the
Species came a revived interest in Lamarckianism. Lamarck had argued that
evolution proceeds through acquired characteristics. Thus habits and physical
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strengthening could be passe d on to offsprin g . Th eoretica lly, a par ent could acquir e phys ica l, int ellec tual , o r eve n mora l qu a liti es throu g h effort and then
tran smit those acquir ed qu alities to his offsprin g . Such an explanation of the
way natur al selec tion work s had an app ea l to religiously and mora lly mind ed
peo ple for it see med to indica te that evolution reward s effort.
B . F. Waddin gton points out that Lam arck 's theory is much less attra ctive to
modern sc ientists than Darwin ' s for the reaso n that Lamarck started with the
co nce pt of w ill whereas D arwin started with fac ts , hard fact s th at ca n be
count ed and entered on a ledge r. But for thi s very reaso n- that Lam arck began
with will- Lam arckian evo lution had an appea l to ethical think ers includin g
even Darwin him se lf. Lamar ckian evolution was es pec ially approv ed by America n phil oso phers such as John Fiske and C harles Sanders Pe irce. Althou gh the
theo ry is now large ly di sca rded (at leas t out side the Sov iet Union) , its popul arity
was an important factor in early enthu sias m for evoluti onary ethics.
A seco nd theo ry, known as co smic evolution , extended the pro ces s of evolution to the entir e uni verse . Herbert Sp ence r, who was an evoluti onist before
Darwin , argued that Darwini an biology was only a spec ial illu strati on of a gen eral prin c iple. Evolution , he argued , was a cos mic law, not co nfin ed in its op era tion to biolog ica l specie s alone. Belief in cos m ic evoluti on prom oted belief
in progress. Th eo log ians found thi s co nvenient for the ir purpo ses since they
were able to put God in charge of thi s evo lution ary proce ss.
The evolutionary theory that eventu ally prevailed in sc ientifi c circl es wa s
much less optimi stic . First of all , it saw natural se lecti on as a pro cess limit ed to
the biolog ical life on thi s plan et and , second , it was di scovered that the surviv al
of th e fitt es t did not necessa ril y lea d to e thi ca l imp rov em ent. Neverth eless,
whenever evo lutionists have bee n stron gly inter es ted in ethi cs , they have tended
to rev ive cos mic evolution . Thi s was the case with Julian Huxle y and perhap s
even more dram aticall y with Teilhard.
For the back ground of thi s articl e it should be kept in mind that the rise and
failur e of evolutionary ethic s wa s intimat ely related to the rise and fall of the se
two altern atives to Darwini sm .
In turnin g to the ori g inal theory, it should be stre sse d that arguments in favor
of evolutionary ethic s proc ee ded along two diff erent line s of thou ght. Fir st , advocates of the theo ry attempt ed to explain how human s came to be moral being s;
that is, they tried to acco unt for the fact that in the evo lution ary process human kind alone appea rs to develop a con science. Th e ori g inal Darwini an theo ry attempted to explain how hum ans acquired such a pow erful and unu sual ca pacity .
In the sec ond place , advocat es of evoluti on attempt ed to derive a stand ard for
ethi ca l behavior from the methods see n at work in the evo lutionary proce ss . Thi s
effort eventually produced two di stinctly diff erent but interr elated line s of argument. Fir st, there was the effort to pro ve that since evo lution work s by the law
of natural se lecti on, the prop er proc edure for humankind was to stand aside to
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permit the survival of the fittes t. Thi s movement came to be known as soc ial
Darwini sm even thou gh , ironi cally, Darwin him se lf was not a soc ial Darwini st.
On anoth er level , some theori sts made appli ca tion of the ir theo ry to the study of
metae thics- the branch of phil os oph y whi ch studi es the statu s of ethica l standard s. In Briti sh phil oso phy, metaethics has been prim aril y co ncerned with definin g such ethica l word s as " goo d " and "o ught. "
Ad voca tes of evo lution ary ethi cs off ered several definiti o ns o f th e word
"goo d ," all clu stered around the word " life. " Wh ereas soci al Darwini sm attempted to give hum ankind a stand ard for ethica l behav ior, metaethi cs attempted
to ju stify the stand phil oso phica lly. Sin ce the evo lutionary standard and argument s for its ju stifi ca tion are interrelated , they will be examin ed toge ther in the
seco nd part of the articl e.
First, however, attention will be dir ec ted toward ex plaining how it happened
that hum ankind alone ca me to be an ethic al anim al. Since hum ans were see n as
only be ings at a higher level of animal existence, it was necessa ry to find tho se
qu alities prese nt in animal life which co uld conce ivably evo lve into such a mora l
phenomenon .

Evolution and Ethical Mankind
A lthough Ch arles Darwin publi shed The Origin of the Spec ies in 1859 , the
impact of the evo lutionar y the sis was not full y felt until 1871, when he publi shed
The Descent of Man . Here Darwin appli ed the prin ciple of natural selec tion to
hum ans and gave a great stimulu s to the effort to und erstand hum ankind as a
produ ct of natur e . J. H. Randall ha s de sc rib ed the effect of thi s the ory on man's
understandin g of him se lf:
Ma n 's re lation to natur e wa s bas ica lly altered. He was no longer a fallen ange l , but a g rea t ape tr y in g to m a ke good , th e las t a nd bes t- bo rn o f natur e's
child re n . '

But even with the thr ea t to hum an dignity impli ed by such a theo ry, Dar win
him self recog nized that hum ankind has a di stin ct greatness, a greatn ess which
ca nnot be eas ily expl ained away. That grea tness could be summed up in the short
but demandin g word " ou ght. " In The Descent of Man , Darw in wrote :
It is the mos t noble of a ll the attribut es o f man , leadin g him with out a moment 's hes itation to risk hi s life for that of a fe llow crea tur e ; or af ter due deliberati on impell ed simpl y by the dee p feeling of right or dut y, to sacri fice it in so me
grea t ca use .'

Aft er thu s paying tribute to co nsci ence, Darwin proc ee ded to inquir e
whether co nscience could be expl ained simpl y in term s of natural hi story; that
'J.H . Randall, " Th e Ch ang ing Impa ct of Darwin on Phil oso phy " in Dar win , Norton
Criti ca l Edition , ed. Philip Appl e man (New York : Norto n, 1970 ) p . 4 12.
' C harles Darwin , The Desce nt of Man (New York : Co llier and Son s, 1901), p. 134 .
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is, Darwin was inquiring whether conscience could be seen as a natural outgrowth of qualities found in animal life. In answer to his own question, Darwin
offered the propositi on that any animal endowed with social instincts would
""inevitably acquire a moral sense or con science, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well , or nearly as well developed as in man." 3 The first step
in acquiring a conscience was thus the development of social instincts which
lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows. The second step,
possible only after highly developed mental powers appeared, was the development of the mental state that causes images of past actions and motives to pass
through the brain.
Several question s already suggest themselves, the most urgent being that of
how social instincts were acquired, given the presupposition of evolution. For
the present let us concede that somewhere in the evolutionary process certain
animals did acquire social instincts. It is a much smaller problem to understand
how such animals acquired opposing tendencies which Darwin called self-regarding instincts. These are the natural impulses of hunger , self-preservation,
and procreation.
It was out of conflict between social instincts and self-regarding impulses
that conscience was seen to arise. The conflict which is first felt as a conflict
between the desire to please others and also to satisfy one's self has a surprising
outcome. The surprising fact is that the social instincts often prevail. Darwin
marveled at this fact and asked:
Why should a man feel that he ought to obey one instinctive desire rather than
another? Why is he bitterly regretful if he has yielded to a strong sense of selfpreservation and has not risked his life to save that of a fellow-creature ? Or why
does he regret having stolen food from hunger ?4

The "ought," according to Darwin , arises from social instincts. But why is
this the case when the self-regarding instincts seem stronger and are so natural
that they need not be cultivated? Darwin concedes that the self-regarding instincts are more powerful , but they are temporary in duration; whereas, the consequences which follow on failure to obey social instincts are ever present for
those who live in a group. Darwin writes concerning those who live in groups:
"They feel at all times, without the stimulus of any special passion or desire ,
some degree of love and sympathy for them ." 5
If a person suppresses an instinct such as hunger, he may feel pain ; but later,
when he is well fed, this denial will be all but forgotten. On the other hand , if
the same person runs from danger rather than come to the rescue of a companion, he is continually reminded of his failure by the sight of his lost companion's
' Ibid. , p. 135.
lbid. , p. 150.
' Ibid. , p. 153.
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family and fri end s. Soc ial instincts thus beco me more press ing beca use peo ple
are constantly reminded of their fa ilures to help others in need . Wh en self-rega rdin g instincts are denied , however, their denial is soo n forgo tten .
Two qu es tions yet rem ain unanswered. Th e first is how co uld the prese nce
of consc ience aid in the stru gg le for survi va l when the fierce stru gg le of natura l
selecti on would see m to favor ruthl ess behav ior. A seco nd co nce rns the orig in
of soc ial instinct s. It is easy to see how se lf-rega rdin g instincts deve loped , but
why did se lf-sac rific ing instin cts orig inate?
In answer to the first, Darwin argues that, in the stru gg le for sur vival, soc ial
instin cts have survi va l power. Furth er, the process of evo lution itse lf tends to
promote the growth of mora l co nsc iousness. Acco rdin g to natu ra l se lec tion ,
stron ger orga nisms prevail in the stru gg le for ex istence. However, on the gro up
level it app ea rs that qu alities such as se lf- sac ri fice , coo pera tion , and love would
give the trib e with the larges t numb er of such memb ers an advantage in the
strugg le for surviva l. Darwin co nclud es: " Thu s the soc ial and moral qu alities
would tend sharply to ad vance and be diffused throu ghout the world. " 6
Th e imm ora l indi v idu al mi g ht survi ve by ruthl ess behav ior, but not the
gro up. Th e other maj or figures of the period , Herbert Spence r and T. H . Huxley,
procee ded to explanations in close ly related ways. Willi am Quilli an , in a piercing critiqu e of thi s subje ct point s out:
The interest of the Evolutionary Naturalists in ethics was primarily naturalistic rather than evolutionary. That is to say, the dogma is: we must explain the
unknown by the known and the known is the sense-known. 7

Thu s, to explain the unkn own , whi ch is conscience, these ea rly evo lutionists
reverted to what was mo st ex plainabl e, that is, anim al instin ct.
In reg ard to the seco nd qu es tion co nce rnin g the origin of social instincts ,
Darwin wa s not so co nfid ent . A major par t of the exp lanation he eventually propose d was the role played by habit. He sugges ted that at leas t so me anim al instincts were acquir ed by practic e. A remot e ances tor prac ticed soc ial virtues and
survived and then passe d on thi s strengthened soc ial instinct to his offsprin g.
Th rough repea ted practi ce and the work of natu ral selec tion, it eventu ally beca me the co nsc ience of man .
At thi s point , however, the Darwini an ex planation ran into troubl e, for it fell
back on the Lamarckian doctrin e of evo lution acc ordin g to acquir ed charac teristics. Quillian point s out the anomaly of thi s: " Thi s introducti on by Darwin of
Lamarckian principle is rath er stra nge in view of cer tain earlier statements in
which he expresse d co ntempt for Lamarck ." 8 Even more seriou s was the acce p"lbid. , p. 176 .
' William Quillian, The Moral Theory of Evolutionary Natura lism (New Haven: Yale
University Press , 1945), p. 12.
' Ibid., p. 75.
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tance in the 1880s of the the sis by Weisman that changes in bodil y or so matic
ce lls are not passe d on throu gh changes in germ ce lls and the co nsequent pro cess of natural se lec tion . Again Quilli an bring s out the signifi ca nce :
It is very likely that habit s do prod uce ce rtain mod ifica tions in the bra in stru cture of an ind ividua l, but these changes occ ur only in the body or soma tic ce lls,
which , so far as pres ent investiga tions ca n determin e , see m to have no influ ence
upo n succee din g genera tions. "

A seco nd part of Darwin 's explanation of soc ial instinct s ran into the sa me
trouble. He found part of the explanation of instin ct as due to changes in the environment. But these changes also co uld alter only body cell s. Simil arly, Herbert Spence r explained the prese nce of soc ial instincts as the acc umul ation of
the experiences of utilit y. Thi s would also be a Lamarckian thes is .
Wh en Julian Huxley attempt ed in the 1940s to rees tabli sh the doc trin e of Evolutionary Ethics, he bega n by noticing Quilli an 's attack of Darwin 's and Sp encer' s analys is. 10 He co nce ded that Quilli an was co rrec t in basing his attac k on
the weakness of Lamarc kianism . He furth er conce ded that modern evo lutionary
natura lism find s three errors with these ninetee nth -ce ntur y explanations: that instincts are ce rtainly not inherited habits or sentim ents; that con sc ience is not an
instinct in any sense in which that word can be used ; and that Darwin denied
any virtue to purely indi vidual activities.
Thi s last point sugges ts a new critic ism of the evo lutionary acco unt. Earl y
evolutionists equ ated moralit y w ith soc ial action s entirely. Yet eac h perso n di scovers that his con sc ience co ncerns actions whi ch involve no one else. He may
feel pangs of con sc ience for overea ting or for drinkin g too much . He feels a demand to be honest with him self. Such duti es may be ju st as comp elling as tho se
co nnec ted with soc ial duti es; yet as se lf-reg ardin g instincts they would not rece ive the social di sapprova l requir ed to develop a co nsc ience . Even so , so me of
a person' s most imp ortant duti es are to himself , and a norm al co nsc ience will
enforce those duti es to himself as much as to oth ers.
After conce ding that Quillian was corr ect in bas ing his attac k on the Lamarckian featur es of Darwin 's and Spencer 's ex planation. Huxley cla ims that
Quilli an's explan ation was weakened beca use it did not includ e twe ntieth centur y represe ntative s . Th e new genera tion of natur alists ha s abandoned the Lamarcki an approach and turned to the psychol og ical explanation s initi ated by
Freud . Huxley dated the be ginnin g of mod ern naturali sm at th e turn of the
centur y:
Th e mod em period of evoluti onary natur alism may be dated very prec ise ly
from the tum of the ce ntur y w ith the nove l outlook o f Freud in psyc ho log y and
the Mendelian s in biology. ' '
9

Jbid .
Juli an Huxley, Touchstone fo r Ethics (New York: Harper, 1947) , p . 29.
"Ibid .
'
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Huxle y then g ives an acco unt of co nsc ience in Freudi an term s. Thi s version
traces the rise of con science to a co nfli ct arising in the infant 's seco nd year. The
mother comes to represe nt the external world and also mediat es its impact. To
the child , the mother beco mes both the source of satisfac tion and the source of
authority. A s the sourc e of authority , she generates anger, hate, and destructive
wishes; whil e as the source of satisfaction she is also loved . Thi s conflict is normally won by love, and the des tructi ve attitud es are bra nded with guilt. Consc ience then comes to be attached to certain attitude s which have been overcom e
by love.
Daiches Raph ael, in pointin g out the failur e of the original Darwini an explanation of the origin of co nsc ience, states that the failur e was so co mplete that
modern evo lutionists follow Huxl ey's exa mple in sea rching for other explanations. Curr ent psychology has abandoned the use of natu ra l se lec tion as an explanation of the moral faculti es and , instead , tries to show how consc ience is
built up from other ment al endowm ents with thi s res ult:
The evolution of ethics as portrayed by mode rn psychologis ts and socia l scientists, therefore , had little in co mm on w ith the spec ifica lly Darwinian concept
of evo lution throu gh natural selec tion . "

Evolutionary Ethics
A seco nd as pec t of the debate concerned the attempt of evo lutionists to develop an ethica l stand ard. Thi s effort includ ed , as mentioned earlier, both an attempt to g ive an evo luti onary definiti on o f ethi ca l term s and to es tabli sh a
criterion for ethic al dec isions.
Th e effort to base ethi ca l stand ards on the workin gs of nature is one of the
most ancient appea ls of ethics; thus it was only natura l that the new key to nature--evo lution-s hould be appea led to for an ethica l standard.
Acco rdin g to Willi am Quilli an , there was a demand at thi s time by scientists
for mora l reform . Whil e ther e always seem s to be a demand for mora l reform ,
this demand was based on growin g faith in science. Mos t ca lls for moral reform
have bee n ca lls to recover old but neglected values. The sc ientists of the Victorian era , however, found fault with the anc ient standard s themselves. They
used the fa ilure of the old standard s to demand moral reform. Their demand for
mora l reform was base d on thre e factors: (a) the unde sirable res ults of theological ethic s which , it was claim ed , prom oted a selfish condition of the heart beca use o f it s promi se o f a po sthum o u s re wa rd , (b ) th e in exa ctn ess o f
utilit ariani sm (the prevailin g philo sophi ca l ethics), and (c) the gap left by the
disappearanc e of theolo gical ethi cs.
12

D. Daiches Raphael , " Darwinian and Ethics " in A Century of Darwin , ed. S . A .
Barnett (Free port , NY : Books for Librari es Press , 1959) , p . 336.
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Of the three promoters of evolution-C harles Darwin , Herbert Spencer, and
T. H. Huxley-o nly Spencer fully embraced the evolutionary theory that came
to be called social Darwinism. Darwin himself was no social Darwinist. Contrary to other evolutionists of the time , Darwin did not believe that natural selection takes place only by brutal struggle . Not only were social virtues of value
to people living in groups, they were also of value to some animals. Huxley
completely rejected the idea that ethical standards could be learned from the
laws of nature . In fact, he argued that ethics and natural selection were antagonistic to each other and that ethical behavior must work aga inst the destructive
forces of nature. Thus, while the first part of this article dealt with an issue on
which all three of the major evolutionists were in agreement, this second part
will concern an issue which was fully endorsed only by Herbert Spencer.
Spencer's main concern was to establish the scientific character of an ethical
standard based on evolution. A similar effort made earlier in the nineteenth century to put ethics on a scientific basis was utilitarianism . According to this philosophy, happiness is the highest good for humankind and thus the basis for
deciding any ethical question is to ask which alternative would bring the most
happiness.
Jeremy Bentham had worked out an elaborate mechanism for measuring various pleasures. For example, eating a steak would have so many units of pleasure, called lots; while a martyr, who sacrifices himself for others, would have
another total made up of the same basic units. The appeal of such a theory was
that pleasure seemed the kind of thing which could be measured scientifically.
If it could, ethical questions could be resolved on a scientific basis.
Bentham 's successo r, John Stuart Mill , accepted pleasure as the standard of
ethics but protested against treating all pleasures in a quantitative way. He saw
a qualitative difference between the pleasures a pig might enjoy in eating and
the pleasure a human being might feel in intellectu al pur suit s. In a famous
expression, he asserted he would rather be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied . Pleasures were discovered to be far too different in quality to be scientifically compared ; thus the conviction was widely felt that a more scientific
standard for ethics must be found.
Spencer thought he had found that more scientific standard in the apparent
goal of evolution, the goal that he understood to be life. Spencer could not settle
on life alone, however, for he continually modified it by qualit ative distinction s.
For example, he argued at one point that higher forms of life are better because
they display better and more numerous adjustments of acts to ends. At this point
Spencer elaborates what seems a quantitative standard , for he argues: " And
along with this greater elaboration of life produced by the pursuit of more nu-
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merous ends, there goe s that increase d du ration of life which co nstitut es the supreme end. " 13
If length of life is the supr eme end , so me of the lower anim als are superior
to human be ings . Spencer, however, backs off from saying that the ethica l standard is length of life alone . He modifi es thi s by sayin g .
Hence , estim ating life , by mul tip lying its length into its bread th , we mu st say
that the aug mentation of it which acco mp anies evo lution o f co nd uct , res ult s fro m
increa se of bo th factors. '"

Now the goa l of evo lution is see n to be both length and breadth of life. But
the sc ientifi c argum ent di sa ppea rs when brea dth is introdu ce d . Breadth of life
is even less meas urable as a sta nda rd than pleas ure, inas much as breadth of life
includes many subjec tive experiences , even pleas ure . Len gth of life is not the
standard, for some in a few yea rs reac h ac hievements whi ch others ca nnot accom pli sh in a hundr e d. Br ea dth o f li fe is a mo re worthy goa l but tota lly
unm eas ura ble.
One poss ibilit y remains for the evo lutionist and that is the poss ibilit y that
the goa l of evo luti o n is th e tota l amo unt of life - the max imum numb er o f
years - for all living form s. Thi s ra ises more que stion s than ca n be answe red .
For exa mple, which is prefera ble , long life for a few or shorter life for many?
Another ques tion would co nce rn the value of various form s of life. We mi ght
sc ientifica lly dec ide whi ch of two alternati ves would produ ce the grea ter qu antity of life, but thi s would still lea ve our press ing ethical qu es tions unanswered .
Spence r recog nized that amount of life was not enough . In add ition to his
introdu ction of breadth of life as part of the standard , at one point (in the sa me
boo k) he fell bac k on hedoni sm itse lf. Thi s is see n in his cl aim that there is one
qu es tion which ethic s mu st ask: ls life wo rth living? He then as ks whether pes simi sts and optimi sts have anythin g in co mm on and he answe rs, " Both the ir arguments ass ume it to be sel f-ev ident that life is goo d or bad , acco rd ing as it
does, or does not brin g a surplu s of ag reea ble fee ling." 15
Thu s , Spence r return ed to hedonism , a doc trin e that he had rej ec ted as be ing
too un sc ientifi c . He went so far as to say that evolution ha s bee n a mi stake if it
does not pro vide a surplu s of ag reea ble feeling . Spencer thu s failed to give a satisfactory expl anation of th e ethi ca l term "g ood " on evoluti onary gro und s .
Nevertheless, evolutionary ethi cs co uld still be vindicated if advoca tes co uld
show that the evo lutionar y pro cess gave ethi ca l guidan ce. Spence r and others
did attempt to demonstrat e that by observin g the way evolution works we ca n
lea rn how peo ple should live.
" Herbert Spence r, The Data of Ethics (New York : Hurst , 1879) , pp. 23 -24.
1
•Ibid. , p . 24 .
" Ibid .

170

RESTORATION QUARTERLY

The question which then arose was that since natural selection is working
for progress, what should humankind do? The answer given at first was that people should stand aside and permit nature to work . Since evolution progresses by
the survival of the fittest, people should not intervene. The worthless would be
destroyed in the struggle for existence. This philosophy became known as Social Darwinism and became influential in American social thought, with one
long-lasting effect- the recurring science of eugenics.
It should be remembered that Darwin himself rejected Social Darwinism.
As noted earlier, he felt that the social qualities of helping others had survival
value , and he also felt that to ignore the helpless would do more damage to the
human spirit than would be gained from eliminating the weak.
Perhaps the best refutation of evolutionary ethics in the nineteenth century
was offered by T. H. Huxley, the fervent defender of evolution. Huxley argued
that natural selection is the antithesis of ethics. Nature is destructive; ethics must
be creative. Huxley used the difference between a cultivated garden and the wild
brush in the forest as an example of the difference between ethical activity and
nature . The garden, cultivated by human effort, is soon strangled by nature
when abandoned . Like John Stuart Mill , Huxley saw nature as a killer. It works
to destroy everything humans do. Optimism has prevented people from seeing
this. " It prevented them from seeing that cosmic nature is no school of virtue,
but the headquarters of the enemy of ethical nature ." 16 The thief and murderer
follow nature as much as the philanthropist. A romantic view of nature has kept
man from seeing that "to be natural" is not the same as to be virtuous . Actually,
ethics has built up an artificial world to fight against the forces of nature. Huxley
thought that right and wrong were ethical qualities learned from some other
source than nature and thus he rejected evolutionary ethics. His grandson, Julian
Huxley, has tried to reestablish ethics on an evolutionary basis.
However, the majority of professional philosophers have rejected evolutionary ethics, even though theologians and some scientists have not. The British
philosopher Anthony Flew points out that most British philosophers have rejected evolutionary ethics out of fear of committing the naturalistic fallacy. This
fallacy, identified at the turn of the century by G . E. Moore, occurs when we try
to substitute a natural quality for the ethical term "goo d." A natural quality
would be any physical or psychological qualit y such as pleasure, happiness, or
even love. The naturalistic fallacy is involved when anyone says that the total
meaning of "goo d" can be replaced by a natural term such as pleasure . According to Moore, if we say "goo d means pleasure," what do we mean when we
say " pleasure is good "? Surely we do not mean " pleasure is pleasure." Moore
concluded that terms such as "goo d" cannot be replaced by natural terms. Good
and right are known directly, just as colors are known . Moore applied this test
'
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to Sp e nce r 's e thic s with c onv inc ing res ult s. To Sp e nc e r 's v iew th at more
evo lved life is better, Moor e replies:
It may, of course, be true that what is more evolved is also higher and better.
But Mr. Spencer does not seem aware that to assert the one is in any case not the
same thing as to assert the other."
As Moo re points out , Spencer does an about-face and sw itches to pleas ure
as the highest goo d . Pleasure is even less suitabl e as a sub stitut e for good than
more evolved. Howeve r, when evo lution falls bac k on pleas ure, it has abando ned
its own stand .
Th ere are other reasons that co ntemp orar y Briti sh phil oso phy rej ec ts evolutionary ethics . One ari ses from the wid es pread rej ec tion of the belief in inev itable pro gress, whi c h went with evo luti onary ethi cs . The only phil oso phy
that takes thi s doc trin e seriously now is dia lec tica l materia lism , and it has no
sc ientifi c base. In co ntemp ora ry philo sophy the idea of an evoluti onar y ethic is
see n as a coro llary of the beli e f in inevit able pro gress . Today, thi s belief is so
di scredit ed that there is amaze ment that the theo ry had such hold .
Anthon y Flew, in trying to expla in why the theory of natura l se lec tion inti mated the doctrin e of inevitabl e pro gress, find s that mu c h o f its strength lay in
the dece pti veness of the phra se "s urviv a l of the fitt es t ." The word " fittes t " has
a definit e moral connotation . As such , it eas ily app ea rs that the doctrin e of natura l selection is producin g better a nd better thin gs throu gh co mpetiti on . However, as Flew points out , "s urviv a l of the fittes t " mea nt onl y the sur vival of
those fitt es t to surviv e. In thi s way, the cap acit y to re produ ce, which is mark ed
in lower classes of soc iety, would be a fitn ess. Flew indic ates that an ethic base d
on natural se lection would be quit e differ ent from wh at is normall y und erstoo d :
If anyone were to complain using this present Darwinian criterion of fitness,
that some particular social arrangement encourages the multiplication of the unfit
and the extermination of the fit , then his complaint would be plainly selfcontradictory. "
Further , Flew rega rds the term " natu ral se lection " as mi s leadin g, for se lec tion impli es choice or purpo se . Such a phra se co ntribut ed to the ready acc ep tance of " natural selec tion " as a surro ga te for divine provid ence. Flew sees the
danger here of mi sleadin g peo ple to overlo ok the fact that natu ra l se lec tion is
blind and nonrati onal. Th e domin ant view, therefor e , of curr ent phil os oph y is
that evo luti on offers no ass uran ce e ither of continu ed pro gress or of any ce rta in
ethi ca l guid ance.
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